California
Appeals

California Appeals
Code Provisions
Rules of Court
Statutory Construction
Standard of Review
Table of Contents

 

Statutory Constructionconstruing the meaning and significance of these revisions,-In re Adrianna P. 8/20/08 CA4/1

Within the statutory framework of the California dependency scheme, section 361.5 generally governs the provision of family reunification services to the child's parents.  It also specifically describes the circumstances in which the court may (and in some circumstances, must) bypass those services.  (§ 361.5, subds. (b), (e)(1).)  The section details who is entitled to receive mandatory reunification services, who may receive reunification services, the circumstances under which the court may deny reunification services to someone otherwise entitled to receive them, and those circumstance under which the court must deny reunification services.  Given this comprehensive framework, the central importance of an appropriate reunification plan to the dependent child, and the carefully delineated exceptions to reunification services, it is unlikely the Legislature intended to strip the court of its authority to deny services to a noncustodial parent pursuant to an applicable bypass provision simply because of the parent's status as a noncustodial, as opposed to a custodial, parent.  

            Statutory changes enacted in 1997 support this conclusion.  Effective January 1, 1998, the Legislature enacted revisions to section 361.5 and changed those entitled to reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (a).  Instead of using the term "parents," the Legislature clarified that "the child's mother and statutorily presumed father" were entitled to receive reunification services, unless an exception applied.  The amended statute also gave the court the discretion under certain circumstances to order services to "the biological father."  (Stats. 1997, ch. 793, § 17, p. 4269.)  In enacting these revisions to section 361.5, subdivision (a), the Legislature did not distinguish between a custodial and noncustodial parent, although earlier cases such as Terry H. and Robert L. had interpreted the term "parent" to refer only to a custodial parent.  Because the Legislature is deemed to be aware of judicial decisions in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light of prior case law, the fact the Legislature did not limit section 361.5, subdivision (a) to custodial parents is significant.  (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329; People v. Neild (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1226.)

            At the same time the Legislature revised subdivision (a), it also added paragraph (13) (now paragraph (14)),[7] to the bypass provisions identified in section 366.26, subdivision (b).  This exception provides the court need not provide reunification services when the "parent or guardian of the child has advised the court that he or she is not interested in receiving family maintenance or family reunification services or having the child returned to or placed in his or her custody and does not wish to receive family maintenance or reunification services."  (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(14).)  Again, the Legislature did not distinguish between a custodial and noncustodial parent.

            In construing the meaning and significance of these revisions, we look to the words of the statutes to determine legislative intent and to fulfill the purpose of the law.  (Gooch v. Hendrix (1993) 5 Cal.4th 266, 282; In re Heraclio A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 569, 574.)  The language is construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, and courts give significance to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuing the legislative purpose.  (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276.) 

            Applying these principles, we conclude the juvenile court is not required to distinguish between a custodial and noncustodial parent when ordering or bypassing reunification services for a child in out-of-home placement.  Section 361.5, subdivision (a), now clearly directs the court to provide reunification services to the child's mother and statutorily presumed father, unless a statutory bypass exception applies.  Moreover, the previously used term "parents," interpreted by Terry H. and Robert L., to apply only to the custodial parent, has been supplanted by the phase "mother or statutorily presumed father" without regard to the parent's custodial status.  (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)  Similarly, the futility of mandating an order of reunification services to a noncustodial parent who does not seek family reunification is now specifically identified as one of the enumerated bypass provisions.  (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(14).) 
In re Adrianna P. 8/20/08 CA4/1

Standard of Review-Table of Contents