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California
Appeals
Standard of Review
Contract Interpretation
Standard of Review-Contract interpretation-Great Western Drywall v. Roel
Construction Great Western asserts the $26,287
backcharge imposes a new contract term to which it never agreed. The
subcontract includes an integration clause that required any amendments
to be in writing and signed by the parties. Paragraph 6j of the
subcontract provides: "Clean up shall be performed daily. If the
project superintendent determines adequate clean up is not being
performed by this subcontractor, Roel . . . reserves the right to
perform the clean up and issue a backcharge for a reasonable cost
associated with such clean up." (Italics added.) Great Western submits
that the term "this subcontractor" means "the question of clean-up must
be considered on a subcontractor by subcontractor basis," and "[n]othing
in the subcontract permits imposition of additional backcharges for work
not directly attributable to the subcontractor itself."
"Contract interpretation presents a
question of law which this court determines independently.
[Citations.] [¶] A contract must be interpreted to give effect to the
mutual, expressed intention of the parties. Where the parties have
reduced their agreement to writing, their mutual intention is to be
determined, whenever possible, from the language of the writing alone."
(Ben-Zvi v. Edmar Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 468,
472-473.) We agree with Great Western's assessment. Under the plain
language of paragraph 6j of the subcontract, Roel may assess backcharges
for cleanup based only on the particular subcontractor's fault.
Accordingly, Roel's award must be reduced from $326,300.75 to
$300,013.75.
Roel asserts that section 15.4e of the
subcontract supports its proration of cleanup charges among
subcontractors. It provides: "Cleanup - At the end of every workday,
Subcontractor shall be responsible to leave its work area clean and free
of debris. Within 24 hours notice by ROEL of an area that requires
cleanup (for which Subcontractor is responsible in ROEL's reasonable
opinion), Subcontractor shall cause the area to be cleaned. If
Subcontractor fails to perform such cleanup then ROEL may cause the area
to be cleaned and back-charge Subcontractor for any costs associated
therewith." (Boldface omitted.) This section, however, does not
authorize backcharges for cleanup that are unconnected to subcontractor
fault. To the contrary, the section supports Great Western's position.
Additionally, Roel claims proration was
reasonable because "[o]n an $80 million jobsite with nearly 100
subcontractors, where a vast amount of overlap occurs in the work being
performed by the subcontractors at any given time, it would be near
impossible to accurately document each subcontractor's exact
cleanup responsibilities." Roel states that the problem was a "foreseen
imbroglio." Roel does not cite the record in support of this claim, but
assuming its truth, it merely shows that Roel anticipated the problem
and could have included a proration clause in the subcontract in place
of section 6j, which would have given subcontractors the opportunity to
accept or reject proration as opposed to it being unilaterally imposed
on them.
Further, Roel contends that even if its
proration constituted an oral modification of the subcontract, Great
Western waived its argument the integration clause prohibited the
modification. Roel cites Civil Code section 1698, subdivision (b),
which provides that a "contract in writing may be modified by an oral
agreement to the extent that the oral agreement is executed by the
parties." Under that provision, "an executed oral agreement may alter
an agreement in writing, even though, as here, the original contract
provides that all changes must be approved in writing." (Miller v.
Brown (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 763, 775.)
Roel relies on the minutes of a July
23, 2002 jobsite meeting, which show a Roel superintendent informed
subcontractors that Roel had hired a person for trash cleanup and "[s]ubs
will be charged on the basis of the number of personnel on the job."
Roel submits that since the minutes show that a Great Western
superintendent, Bob Wasko, attended the meeting, but they do not show he
made any objection, the company acquiesced in the proration of cleanup
costs.
" ' "[W]aiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts."
[Citations.] The burden . . . is on the party claiming a waiver of a
right to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave
the matter to speculation, and "doubtful" cases will be decided against
a waiver" [citation].' [Citations.] The waiver may be either express,
based on the words of the waiving party, or implied, based on conduct
indicating an intent to relinquish the right." (Waller v. Truck Ins.
Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31.)
The evidence belies a waiver theory.
Stephanie Schulkamp, Great Western's chief operations officer at the
relevant time, testified that Wasko had no authority to enter into
agreements on behalf of Great Western. Wasko also testified he had no
authority to consent to a backcharge on behalf of Great Western, and he
never agreed to a prorated backcharge for cleanup. He also testified
Great Western "had enough manpower to clean up anything." Further, Roel
never presented any evidence that Wasko had any authority to bind Great
Western. Also, there is no evidence Roel modified its behavior based on
anything Wasko may have said, or on his mere silence. At the July 23,
2002 jobsite meeting, Roel did not seek the input of subcontractors on
the cleanup issue. Rather, the evidence shows Roel informed
subcontractors it unilaterally decided that "everybody's going to be
backcharged based on the percentage of employees working on-site."
Accordingly, Roel did not meet its burden of showing an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.
Great Western Drywall v. Roel Construction
8/13/08 CA4/1-D049191

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