California
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Standard of Review
 

Standard of Review-Constitution-Silicon Valley Taxpayers v. Santa Clara Co. OSA

However, a valid assessment under Proposition 218 must not only be approved by a weighted majority of owners under the procedural requirements in article XIII D, section 4, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e), but must also satisfy the substantive requirements in section 4, subdivision (a).  (Art. XIII D, § 4, subds. (a), (c)-(e).)  These substantive requirements are contained in constitutional provisions of dignity at least equal to the constitutional separation of powers provision.  (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)  Before Proposition 218 became law, special assessment laws were generally statutory, and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine served as a foundation for a more deferential standard of review by the courts.  But after Proposition 218 passed, an assessment’s validity, including the substantive requirements, is now a constitutional question.  “There is a clear limitation, however, upon the power of the Legislature to regulate the exercise of a constitutional right.”  (Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 471.)  “ ‘[A]ll such legislation must be subordinate to the constitutional provision, and in furtherance of its purpose, and must not in any particular attempt to narrow or embarrass it.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Thus, a local agency acting in a legislative capacity has no authority to exercise its discretion in a way that violates constitutional provisions or undermines their effect.

We “ ‘ “must . . . enforce the provisions of our Constitution and ‘may not lightly disregard or blink at . . . a clear constitutional mandate.’ ” ’ ”  (State Personnel Bd. v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 512, 523.)  In so doing, we are obligated to construe constitutional amendments in a manner that effectuates the voters’ purpose in adopting the law.  (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Salinas (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355.)

Proposition 218 specifically states that “[t]he provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 218, § 5, p. 109; Historical Notes, supra, p. 85.)  Also, as discussed above, the ballot materials explained to the voters that Proposition 218 was designed to:  constrain local governments’ ability to impose assessments; place extensive requirements on local governments charging assessments; shift the burden of demonstrating assessments’ legality to local government; make it easier for taxpayers to win lawsuits; and limit the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.  Because Proposition 218’s underlying purpose was to limit government’s power to exact revenue and to curtail the deference that had been traditionally accorded legislative enactments on fees, assessments, and charges, a more rigorous standard of review is warranted.  We construe article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f) — the “burden . . . to demonstrate” provision — liberally in light of the proposition’s other provisions, and conclude that courts should exercise their independent judgment in reviewing local agency decisions that have determined whether benefits are special and whether assessments are proportional to special benefits within the meaning of Proposition 218.  (Redevelopment Agency v. County of Los Angeles (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 68, 74 [courts exercise independent judgment in matters involving constitutional interpretation]; see People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894 [courts use independent, de novo review for mixed questions of fact and law that implicate constitutional rights].)

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