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Standard of Review
 

Standard of Review-Civil Code Sec. 232/Family Code Sec. 7822 ‘shall be liberally construed to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child.’ ([Civ. Code] § 232.5.)”Adoption of Allison C

 In Daniel M., the Court of Appeal interpreted Civil Code section 232 (section 7822’s predecessor statute) to “require intent to abandon for the statutory period only,” rather than permanently.  (Daniel M., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.)  The court based its interpretation on the statute’s purpose “‘to serve the welfare and best interests of a child by providing the stability and security of an adoptive home when those conditions are otherwise missing from his or her life’” (Civ. Code § 232.6), and the Legislature’s directive “that proceedings to terminate parental rights ‘shall be determined as expeditiously as possible’ ([Civ. Code] § 232.3) and that [Civil Code] section 232 ‘shall be liberally construed to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child.’ ([Civ. Code] § 232.5.)”  (Daniel M., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 884.)  These purposes “would be defeated if the intent to abandon requirement . . . were interpreted to ‘allow an absent parent to totally forsake and desert his [or her] child for years at a time without fear of [losing] parental rights simply because he [or she] had the intent to reestablish the parent-child relationship at some indefinite time in the future.’”  (Id. at p. 884.)  Under that construction, a parent could deny an abandoned child “an adoptive home merely by planning to resume relations with the child when he or she near[ed] adulthood”; such a child might “effectively . . . be compelled to endure a childhood without any parents at all.”  (Ibid.)  “[A] child’s need for a permanent and stable home cannot be postponed for an indefinite period merely because the absent parent may envision renewing contact with the child sometime in the distant future. . . .   ‘The reality is that childhood is brief; it does not wait while a parent rehabilitates himself or herself.’”  (Ibid.)

                        Here, the court explained its reasoning at length in its oral statement of decision.  It first stressed the statute’s “overall philosophy” — expressed in section 7800 — to serve the child’s best interest by providing the stability and security of an adoptive home where those conditions are otherwise lacking.  Noting section 7890’s mandate that a court “‘bear[] in mind the age of the child,’” the court observed that Allison was then six years old and had lived in stepfather’s home for “about a couple years now.”  Relying on Daniel M., the court focused on whether father intended to abandon Allison for at least one year.  The court noted Allison, at age six, was “[o]ne-third of the way to majority,” and stated:  “[I]f a parent is incarcerated for . . . five [or] ten years, . . . to say you can’t adopt this child because . . . you are incarcerated, unable to support or communicate with the child for that period of time because of your incarceration,[is not] fair to the child.”  As Daniel M. explained, the end result could be that “the child would never be adopted.”  The court explained at length the basis for its findings father failed to support or communicate with Allison for the statutory period.  The court noted stepfather is a “good, stable person” providing a stable home.  In sum, the court looked at “whether the elements have in general been met and whether they complied with the statute and whether the termination of the parental rights is in the best interests of the child.”

                        We are more than satisfied the court correctly applied the law.  The court’s detailed statement of decision revealed it considered father’s voluntary actions underlying his incarcerations as well as his other actions while not incarcerated and while in prison.  “‘[T]he question whether such intent to abandon exists and whether it has existed for the statutory period is a question of fact for the trial court, to be determined upon all the facts and circumstances of the case.’”  (In re Brittany H. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 533, 550.)  The court did not err in finding father abandoned Allison for at least one year under section 7822.

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