California
Appeals

Standard of Review-Attorney Fees Award - Molski v. Arciero Wine GroupB199289

In July of 2005, the federal trial court dismissed Molski's state law claims against Arciero without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.  Subsequently, only the ADA claim for injunctive relief remained pending in federal court.  In July of 2005, Arciero's counsel notified Molski's counsel that all alleged violations had been remediated.  Arciero provided photographic evidence.  Molski's expert personally verified the remediation on August 24, 2005.  On August 31, 2005, Molski and Arciero stipulated that the claim for injunctive relief was moot because all alleged noncompliance had been remediated.  Pursuant to the stipulation, Molski dismissed the federal action with prejudice. 

                        On August 10, 2005, after Molski received notice and evidence of the completed remediation but before Molski sent his expert to verify it, Molski filed the present action against Arciero in San Luis Obispo Superior Court (the state action).  Molski did not serve the state action until after the federal stipulation had been filed.  Molski's state action was based upon the same alleged conditions that had formed the basis of Molski's federal action.  Molski asserted claims for monetary relief under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the DPA, Health and Safety Code section 19955 and for injunctive relief under section 55. 

                        In January 2006, the state trial court granted Arciero's motion to strike Molski's claims for injunctive relief (§ 55) as moot, leaving only Molski's claims for monetary relief and attorneys' fees pursuant to sections 51, 51.5, 52, 54, 54.1 and 54.3.  Nevertheless, Molski's amended complaint retained a request "for relief that is afforded by Civil Code . . . [section] 55" and continued to allege (incorrectly) that the access barriers had not been remediated.  Molski corrected some of these allegations in a second amended complaint, filed pursuant to stipulation and order, but the second amended complaint still alleged he was entitled to "the relief that is afforded by" section 55 and prayed for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under section 55.

                        In June 2006, Arciero moved for judgment on the pleadings in the state action as to all remaining causes of action.  Arciero argued that Molski was asserting in state court the same primary right that he had previously dismissed with prejudice in federal court.  The trial court denied Arciero's motion.  We issued an alternative writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its order and to instead grant Arciero's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or to show cause why it should not.  The trial court set aside its previous order and entered a new order granting Arciero's motion for judgment on the pleadings in the state action.

                        Arciero then moved for an order awarding its attorneys' fees as the prevailing party pursuant to section 55.  Arciero sought to recover fees that it incurred in federal and state court defending against Molski's claims.  Molski opposed the motion on the grounds that Arciero should not be considered to be the prevailing party, and that even if Arciero prevailed it should not recover any fees that were incurred in federal court or after dismissal of the state court claim for injunctive relief. 

                        The trial court awarded all of Arciero's attorneys' fees incurred in state court, but not the fees incurred in federal court.  The trial court found that Arciero prevailed in the state action because the state action was filed after remediation was complete and "played no role" in bringing about the remediation.  The trial court found that Arciero did not prevail in the federal action because the federal action was the catalyst for remediation.

DISCUSSION

                        A reviewing court may not disturb a trial court's decision on the matter of attorney fees absent a clear abuse of discretion.  (Donald v. Café Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 185.)  We reject Molski's contention that the fee award in this case constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 

                        Section 55 authorizes an action to enjoin a violation of California's access laws, and provides that "[t]he prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees."  Other provisions of California's disability access statutes allow only a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees (§§ 52 & 54.3), but the plain language of section 55 allows bilateral fee recovery.  The statute is unambiguous and Molski cites no authority interpreting section 55 to disproportionately benefit plaintiffs.

                        Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) provides that the defendant is the prevailing party if dismissal is entered in its favor or if the plaintiff does not recover any relief against it, unless the context clearly requires otherwise.  A plaintiff may "prevail" for purposes of section 55 if the lawsuit was the catalyst motivating the defendant to modify its behavior or the plaintiff achieved the primary relief sought.  (Donald v. Café Royale, Inc., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 185 [award of fees to defendant restaurant reversed where the restaurant went out of business as a result of the cost of compliance, rendering plaintiff's request for injunction moot but not rendering the restaurant a prevailing party]; Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation (9th Cir. 2002) 277 F.3d 1128 [affirming award of fees to a disabled coach who prevailed by obtaining access to the baseball field and $10,000 in a settlement agreement].)  

                        The trial court acted within its discretion when it determined that Arciero was the prevailing party in the state court action.  In state court, Molski obtained none of the relief he sought.  Arciero obtained judgment in its favor on every cause of action.  Substantial evidence supported the trial court 's finding that the state action played no role in the remediation.  After Molski's claim for injunctive relief was stricken, he continued to seek relief pursuant to section 55.  The order granting Arciero judgment on the pleadings was a final adjudication on the merits of all remaining claims in favor of Aciero.  (O'Moore v. Driscoll (1933) 135 Cal.App. 770, 772.) 

                        Molski argues that, notwithstanding the plain language of section 55 and the outcome of this litigation, a prevailing defendant should only be awarded fees if the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.  There is no California precedent for Molski's position.  He relies upon federal authority which holds that in an action to enforce the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, attorneys' fees should not be assessed against the plaintiff unless its claims were "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so."  (Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 422.) 

                        In Christiansburg, the Court reasoned that imposition of fees against a plaintiff "simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII."  (Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 422.)  This concern does not apply to access litigation in California state court, where a plaintiff controls the relative risks, burdens and benefits by selecting from among several statutory options. 

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