California
Appeals

Contract Interpretation

Defendant contends, citing principles that govern the interpretation of contracts, that he did not violate the Cruz waiver because the waiver was effective only until September 19, 2005, and he committed the robbery after that date.  The Attorney General acknowledges that defendant’s change of plea form includes a handwritten notation “Cruz waiver until 9/19/05,” that being the date originally set for defendant’s sentencing, but contends that the waiver was to remain in effect until defendant was sentenced, an intent evidenced by the standardized preprinted terms of the Cruz waiver set out in the change of plea form, as well as by the trial court’s advisement to defendant at the time he entered his change of plea.  We agree with the Attorney General for reasons we now explain.

            Resolution of this issue turns, as defendant notes, on principles pertinent to contract interpretation because “[a] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract principles.  [Citations.]  ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.  (Civ. Code, § 1636.)  If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.  (Civ. Code, § 1638.)  On the other hand, “[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood it.”  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]  ‘The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.  [Citations.]’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.)

            Application of these principles to defendant’s plea agreement leads us to conclude that the parties intended defendant’s Cruz waiver to remain in effect until defendant actually was sentenced, and that did not occur until after defendant committed the robbery.  The standardized preprinted Cruz waiver provision set out in the change of plea form, states in pertinent part, that in return for being released on his own recognizance and as part of his plea bargain agreement, defendant waives his right to withdraw his plea and his right not to receive any additional punishment for any failure to appear or new offense and, “as a condition of my release, I will: [¶] . . . [¶] c.  Appear in court for sentencing, or any other date set by the court.  [¶]  d.  Not violate any law (excluding infractions) between today and the date of sentencing.”  The change of plea form also includes the previously mentioned handwritten notation, “Cruz waiver until 9/19/05.”

Defendant argues that the handwritten notation prevails over the standardized terms of the printed form, and therefore the Cruz waiver was in effect only until September 19, 2005.  To support his claim defendant cites Civil Code section 1651 which states that when handwritten and printed terms in a contract conflict, the handwritten provisions prevail over the printed terms “if the two are absolutely repugnant.”[4]

The handwritten and standardized preprinted provisions in defendant’s change of plea form do not conflict, and even if they were in conflict, they are not “absolutely repugnant,” defendant’s contrary claim notwithstanding.  The standardized preprinted provision, quoted above, specifies that the Cruz waiver will remain in effect until defendant is sentenced.  The trial court reiterated the duration of the Cruz waiver in taking defendant’s guilty plea – “[D]o you understand if you fail to come back to court for any date that I give you for sentencing or violate the law between now and the time I sentence you . . . or if you contact the victim in any way, or possess any firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons in any way before I sentence you, and I find out about it, instead of getting four years, which you’ve been promised here today, you’re going to get eight years.  I promise you that.”   The trial court, at the request of defense counsel, then set defendant’s sentencing hearing for September 19, 2005, and that date is specified in the handwritten provision.

In short, the handwritten term, or provision, specifies the specific sentencing date the parties agreed to at the time they entered into the plea agreement.  Because both the preprinted provision and the handwritten provision both identify the date of sentencing as the pertinent date, the two provisions are not in conflict.  Moreover, even if we were to conclude otherwise, the two provisions are not absolutely repugnant.  The standardized preprinted Cruz waiver specifies the length of time defendant’s Cruz waiver would remand effective, i.e., until sentencing.  The handwritten notation specifies the date the parties originally contemplated that sentencing would occur, “9/19/05.”

Any doubt that remains as to the parties’ intent regarding the duration of the Cruz waiver is dispelled by their conduct, which further demonstrates that they intended the Cruz waiver to remain in effect until defendant was actually sentenced.  That conduct includes the fact that at the time the trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea and the Cruz waiver, the trial court clarified that defendant would be released and “be sentenced September 19th to four years in state prison . . . .”  Later, when the trial court continued the September 19, 2005, sentencing hearing, defendant remained free on his own recognizance, and the trial court did not require defendant to agree to another Cruz waiver.  Nor did the trial court require additional Cruz waivers at any of the subsequently continued sentencing hearings.  In short, it is apparent from the terms set out in the change of plea form, the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the plea agreement, and the subsequent conduct of the parties that the parties intended the Cruz waiver to remain in effect until defendant actually was sentenced in this case.  Accordingly, we reject defendant’s assertion that the Cruz waiver was not in effect in October when he committed the robbery. People v. Vargas, E039738 3/14/07 CA4/2 ; People. v. Vargas. E039738,  3/14/07 CA4/2-PDF